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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE*
LLOYD W. HERROLD$
The Problem
The businessman engaged in commerce which crosses state borders
faces a series of exceedingly vexing problems. Aside from the fact that
the various states, acting as sovereign majesties, impose a multitude of
diverse levies which may effect a particular transaction, the decisions
of the courts may appear to him to be illogical and even contradictory.
His frustration is compounded by the fact that his tax counsel is often
forced to hedge'his opinions as to the consequences of a particular act.
Before discussing some current developments, including certain recent
Wisconsin tax cases, this article will consider the problem in terms of
the federal limitations on the taxation of interstate commerce by the
states.
Judicially Imposed Federal Limitations
The Northwestern States-Portland Cement Co. decision' established
that the Constitution does uot bar a state from taxing on an apportioned
basis the net income of foreign corporations operating solely in inter-
state commerce where there are sufficient activities carried on by the
taxpayer to give the taxing state jurisdiction to impose its tax. The two
constitutional provisions which underlie that decision and this discus-
sion are the commerce clause in article I, section 8, and the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
It seems clear that one purpose of the framers of 'the Constitution
in drafting the commerce clause was to secure free trade among the
states.2 This has been recognized repeatedly by the United States Su-
preme Court.3 Thus, at least in theory, any charge for services and
facilities, including the use of state courts, is valid only if it does not
* This article is based on a lecture given at the Fourteenth Annual Marquette
University Institute on Taxation.
** C.P.A.; Manager, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
'Northwestern States Portland Cement Company v. Minnesota; Georgia v.
Stockham Valve and Fittings, Inc., 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
2 HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST, No. 11 (1788).
3 E.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
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restrict this free trade. In determining whether such a restriction does
in fact result, it would seem that the emphasis should be placed on the
ultimate effect of the tax under consideration.
Insofar as the due process clause is concerned, the question is
whether there is sufficient nexus, or jurisdictional connection, between
the taxpayer and the taxing state to enable the state to enforce its tax.
Absent this connection, the tax may not be imposed. Much of the ap-
parent confusion in the cases results from the fact that the courts have
tended to use the commerce clause and due process provisions inter-
changeably.4
A determination of whether a given state tax does in fact restrict
free trade and thereby infringes upon the power of Congress to regulate
commerce among the several states may involve considering the ultimate
economic impact of the tax, including an analysis of the effect of all
other state taxes affecting the particular activity, both locally and in
other jurisdictions. It may be that the burden of assembling and evalu-
ating the necessary evidence is beyond the capacity of the taxpayer and
of the courts.
Whatever the reason, the courts have tended to avoid decisions
rendered squarely under the commerce clause and have often decided
cases on the basis of jurisdiction. The fact that the Court is aware of
the nature and difficulty of the problem it faces is indicated by language
such as that of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Alinnesota :5
Each new means of interstate transportation and communi-
cation has engendered controversy regarding the taxing powers
of the States inter se and as between the States and the Federal
Government. Such controversies and some conflict and confu-
sion are inevitable under a federal system. They have long been
the source of difficulty and dissatisfaction for us....
Whatever the bases of decision in various cases, it is clear that a
tax which discriminates against interstate commerce, as compared with
intrastate commerce, is unconstitutional. This is true whether the tax
is discriminatory on its face or in operation. As early as 1887 the Court
found a tax imposed only upon solicitors operating without a regular
place of business in the taxing state to be discriminatory.6 In a recent
opinion7 holding that a particular state tax was discriminatory in oper-
ation and therefore unconstitutional, Mr. Chief Justice Warren ob-
4 Braniff Airways Inc. v. Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590 (1954) illustrates the problem.
In that case, the majority found that the taxpayer had sufficient contact with
the state for its property tax to apply, thus deciding the case on the basis of
due process. On the other hand, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, seems
to have felt that the issue should have been decided under the commerce
clause in view of the danger of multiple taxation.
5 Note 3 supra, at 300.
6 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
7 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
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served that "equality for the purposes of competition and the flow of
commerce is measured in dollars and cents, not legal abstractions.""
The dollar-and-cents effect is basic to a determination of whether a tax
is discriminatory.
If the mandate of the Constitution is that free trade among the
states is not to be restricted, a further requirement should be that the
same transaction may not be taxed in more than one state. However,
consider the hypothetical case of a Wisconsin manufacturer having
85% of its property and manufacturing cost in Wisconsin which sells
under a master contract to a purchaser in Iowa with delivery made from
an Iowa warehouse. Presumably, at the present time, Wisconsin would
claim the right to tax 90% of the profit and Iowa 100%, for a total of
190%.' There is every reason to believe that the Court would sustain the
taxes imposed even though it would appear that this is a prima facie
case of a restrictive multiple-tax burden being imposed upon interstate
commerce. This is the result because each tax is apportioned and the
Court has refused to determine what constitutes a proper apportionment
formula.
In one case the Court has reversed a state supreme court where an
apportionment formula was challenged. In Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v.
North Carolina ex ret. Maxwell,'0 a single factor formula (property)
was involved and it was established by the taxpayer that on a separate
accounting basis only 17% of its income was earned in the taxing state
while under the one-factor formula some 80% would be subjected to
tax. The Court found this to be unreasonable. It has never struck down
a multiple-factor formula, often refusing even to hear the cases decided
in the state courts."
The language of the Court in the Northwestern States case,12 how-
ever, is of interest: "Logically it is impossible, when the tax is fairly
apportioned, to have the same income taxed twice. In practical opera-
tion, however, apportionment formulas being what they are, the possi-
bility of the contrary is not foreclosed, especially by levies in domiciliary
states. But that question is not before us."'13 Even if the Court is chal-
lenging taxpayers to present detailed economic evidence to show a
burden on interstate commerce, can this challenge be met?
The basic question is whether a state may impose a tax upon inter-
state activities in the first place. In the Spector Motor Service case14
8 Id. at 70.
9Wis. STAT. §71.07(2) (1961); IOWA CODE §422.33(b) (1962), Iowa Reg.
§22.33(1) -9(b) (2) ; cf. Note, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Inter-
state Business, 75 HARV. L. REv. 953, 966 (1962).
10 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
" E.g., Moore Motor Freight Lines, Inc., infra note 32; W. R. Arthur & Co.
v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation, infra note 33.
12 Note 1 supra.
13 Id. at 462.
14 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
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solely in interstate commerce. The Court commented: "The State is not
precluded from imposing taxes upon other activities or other aspects
of this business which, unlike the privilege of doing interstate business,
it was held that a state may not tax the privilege of doing business
are subject to the sovereign power of the State."'" Presumably, if the
Court had found that the privilege involved had included intrastate
activities as well the result would have been different.
Where sufficient jurisdictional connection could be found, the Court
has sustained taxes on property used in interstate commerce' G as well
as taxes on business done within a state which are measured by net
income. For many years the leading case in the latter category was
United States Glue Corp. v. Town of Oak Creek17 in which a domestic
Wisconsin corporation doing substantial business in and out of the
state was found to be subject to Wisconsin's apportioned net income tax.
The United States Ghe decision'8 left open the question as to
whether such a tax could be imposed only where intrastate business
was involved along with interstate business. The holding in Northwest-
ern States 9 that solely interstate operations may be taxed, provided that
the taxing state has jurisdiction, answered the question. After stating
that the taxes involved were not regulations in any sense of the term,
did not discriminate against nor impose undue burdens on either cor-
poration, and that commerce should bear its fair share of the costs of
the benefits it derives from within a state, the Court said "the levies
are not privilege taxes based on the right to carry on business in the
taxing state. The states are left to collect only through ordinary means.
The tax, therefore, is 'not open to the objection that it compels the
company to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.' "'0
In attempting to reconcile the decision with that in the Spector case,2'
it further stated that the taxes involved were based only upon the net
profits earned in the taxing state, while in Spector2 2 the tax was based
upon the privilege of doing business as such. A reader having difficulty
with this distinction may take comfort in the dissents of Justices Whit-
taker and Frankfurter.
23
In finding that the states involved had jurisdiction to impose their
respective taxes in Northwestern States,2" the Court stated: "It strains
reality to say, in terms of our decisions, that each of the corporations
15 Id. at 609.
16 Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944); Braniff Airways v.
Nebraska, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
"7247 U.S. 321 (1918).
is Ibid.
19 Note 1 supra.
20 Id. at 462.
21 Note 14 supra.
22 Ibid.
23 Note 1 supra, at 470.
24 Note 1 supra.
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here was not sufficiently involved in local events to forge 'some definite
link, some minimum connection' sufficient to satisfy due process re-
quirements. ' 25 The local events were the regular and systematic solicita-
tion of orders by- employees operating from local sales offices within the
taxing states.
Public Law 86-272
Following this decision, and after certiorari had been denied in
cases where the local events consisted of the solicitation of orders only26
and promotional activities,17 Congress reacted to the many hints given
it by the Court,2 and took a very short and cautious step toward allevi-
ating the problem by enacting Public Law 86-272.29 This statute is a
narrow one, prohibiting a net income tax on income derived by a foreign
corporation from interstate commerce if the only activities involved
are solicitation by salesmen and/or independent contractors of orders
for tangible personal property which are approved and filled outside
the state, and/or solicitation of such orders for a company's customers.
This has the effect of establishing a niinimum jurisdictional connection,
or nexus, with the taxing state. Therefore, if the local activities fall
short of those involved in the Northwestern States"0 situations where
local sales offices were maintained, the tax may not be imposed.
The statute has been subjected to criticism. It has been argued that
there would be substantial revenue lost to the states and that uniform
legislation would be preferable. It has been attacked on the ground that
it provides for preferential tax immunity which discriminates against
intrastate commerce.31 This latter objection may be countered in part
by citing the impact of multiple taxation on interstate business.
In addition, the statute has been attacked as being unconstitutional.
The argument may be summarized as follows: The commerce itself is
completed before the tax is imposed. Therefore, it is not commerce
which is being regulated but taxation. Congress may not deprive a state
of a power necessary to its survival, i.e., the power to tax.
This constitutional question is involved at the time of this writing
25 Id. at 464.
26 International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
27 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So.
2d 70 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
28 Black, J., concurring in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota: "The differing
views of members of the Court in this and related cases illustrate the diffi-
culties inherent in the judicial formulation of general rules to meet the na-
tional problems arising from state taxation which bears in incidence upon
interstate commerce. These problems it seems to me, call for Congressional
investigation, consideration and action. The Constitution gives that branch of
government the power to regulate commerce among the states, and until it
acts I think we should enter the field with extreme caution.'
29 73 Stat. 555 (1959). 86th Con., S 2524, Sept. 14, 1959 as amended.
30 Note 1 supra.
3148 A.B.A.J. 532 (1962).
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in an appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana from a lower court
decision. 32 In this case the only activity of fhe taxpayer was the sending
of fifteen traveling salesmen into Louisiana to solicit orders. The lower
court reviewed the Supreme Court decisions recognizing the power of
Congress and held that the statute was a proper exercise of congres-
sional authority. Ten other states have filed amicus curiae briefs.
33
The experience of tax practitioners indicates that the various state
tax administrators will attempt to construe the statute narrowly. For
example, it has been considered to be inapplicable where, in addition to
solicitation of orders, the salesmen assisted in obtaining financing, main-
taining the equipment and leasing premises for customers as part of an
advertised service; and, where activities in addition to the solicitation
of orders were carried on only in order to comply with state alcoholic
beverage laws. In another situation a corporation engaged only in
selling on a commission basis was considered by state taxing authorities
to be merely rendering a "service" and therefore was not exempted by
the statute.
The statute may properly be criticized as being too narrow. It pro-
vides no protection for the sale of intangibles and services, and leaves
open the question as to what additional activities beyond solicitation
will sustain a tax. Limited as it is, it has already cost one taxpayer the
right to make use of a statutory apportionment formula. 34 It is obvious
that, aside from the attempts to limit (or eliminate) the statute, many
basic problems remain unresolved.
Recent Developments
Turning to recent developments, the Supreme Court in the spring
of 1963 held that a use tax may not discriminate against out-of-state
transactions.3 5 Louisiana had attempted to impose its use tax on the full
cost of specialized equipment which had been assembled outside of the
state, including labor and overhead, despite the fact that its sales tax
applied only to the materials element in cost. The Court refused to sanc-
tion a use tax which imposed a heavier burden than the sales tax.
A recently enacted Indiana statute is of some interest.36 This im-
poses a tax on adjusted gross income ("taxable income" as defined in
section 63 of the Internal Revenue Code with certain adjustments).
Since a credit is given for Indiana gross receipts tax, the effect will be
that the new tax will apply only to interstate operations. The appor-
tionment formula included was adopted from the Uniform Division of
32 International Shoe Co. v. Collector of Revenue, 19th Jud. Dist. Ct. La.,
Jul. 12, 1963.
3324 CCH STATE TAX REV. No. 41.34 John Ownbey Co., Inc., Tenn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 1963.
3 Note 7 supra.
36 Adjusted Gross Income Tax Act of 1963, H.B. 1509, Ind. Laws, 1st Spec.
Sess.
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Income for Tax Purposes Act and includes a destination sales factor.
However, sales shipped to the United States Government or to a state
in which the taxpayer is not subject to tax will-be apportioned to Indi-
ana. Indiana, therefore,. seems prepared to make certain that all inter-
state sales over which it has jurisdiction will be subject to tax some-
where.
Recent Wisconsin Decisions
In the oldest income tax state, Wisconsin, a three-factor statutory
apportionment formula is provided for "persons engaged in business
within and without the state. ' 37 The factors are tangible property, cost
of manufacturing (which includes materials, manufacturing payroll
and burden), and "the total sales made through or by offices, agencies
or branches located in Wisconsin during the income year to the total
net sales made everywhere during said income year. '38 The Wisconsin
Department of Taxation is also given specific statutory authority to pro-
vide special rules governing apportionment where the statutory method
does not properly assign income to the State of Wisconsin. 39 Unfortu-
nately, special rulings are not made available to the public generally
and are not binding upon the Department; nor are regulations pro-
mulgated which could serve as guides to department policy.
Cases in recent years involving Wisconsin motor carriers illustrate
the uncertainty which results when the statutory formula is not prop-
erly applicable. In Moore Motor Freight Lines" the Department of
Taxation succeeded in imposing a two-factor formula, consisting of
revenue and mileage, on a Minnesota-based common carrier which con-
ducted no Wisconsin intrastate business. The carrier had no terminals,
officers or domicilized employees in Wisconsin but the court found that
73.21% of its revenue miles were over Wisconsin roads. In the absence
of any specific statutory exemption for motor carriers, the court held
that the activities of the taxpayer were sufficient to subject it to tax
under the Wisconsin statutes. The rule in Northwestern States41 was
controlling and permitted a fairly apportioned nondiscriminatory
tax on interstate commerce as a valid means of compensating for ac-
tivities carried on within the borders of the taxing state. With regard
to the fairness of the apportionment formula, it is worth noting that
the revenue factor was zero. The court also found that on the facts
there was sufficient nexus to sustain the imposition of the tax.
The problem of determining a proper apportionment formula for a
motor carrier was considered more recently in W. R. Arthur & Co. v.
37 WIs. STAT. §71.07(2) (1961).
38 Wis. STAr. §71.07(2) (c) (1961).
39 WIs. STAT. §71.07(5) (1961).
40 Moore Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation, 14
Wis. 2d 377, 111 N.W. 2d 148 (1961).
41 Note 1 supra.
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Wisconsin Department of Taxation.4 ' This case involved an Illinois
contract carrier having its offices and main terminal located in Janes-
ville, Wisconsin. The carrier served one large Wisconsin customer lo-
cated in Janesville under a contract executed in Detroit. The taxpayer
apportioned its income in its Wisconsin returns to Wisconsin on the
basis of revenue miles alone. Upon audit, after considering some fif-
teen different factors, the Department made an additional assessment
based on two factors, revenue miles and payroll. The payroll factor was
based on where the particular employee was headquartered, not where
he actually earned his salary or wages. The taxpayer filed an applica-
tion for abatement and the Department revised its formula to include
three separate factors: (a) revenue miles, (b) payroll, and (c) originat-
ing revenues. This last factor was deemed to be 100% in Wisconsin,
as all of the revenue was received at the office in Janesville.
The Wisconsin Board of Tax Appeals sustained the Department,
relying heavily on the Moore case. 43 The Circuit Court of Dane County
found that the revenue factor was arbitrary and reversed, distinguish-
ing the Moore case on the ground that the issue there was not whether
the apportionment formula itself was proper but whether or not the
taxpayer was in fact doing business in Wisconsin and was subject to
taxation.4 The circuit court was reversed in turn by the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin which found that the originating revenue or gross receipts
factor was not arbitrary and did not taint the ultimate formula adopted.
While the originating revenue factor standing alone might be unfair,
it was not arbitrary when used in conjunction with the two other factors.
An appeal to the United States Supreme Court was denied per curiam
on June 10, 1963.
In Globe-Union, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation45 the
taxpayer, a Delaware corporation, had its main office in Wisconsin and
produced batteries and other products in a number of states including
Wisconsin. A major portion of its sales were under agreements signed
by the president or chairman of the board providing for future sales
to the contracting customers. Generally, as customers needed additional
products they were requisitioned from the nearest factory operated by
the taxpayer. Billings were prepared by the shipping factory with copies
forwarded to the Milwaukee office and remittances made to the Mil-
waukee office. Sales to noncontract customers were based on quotations
prepared and approved in the Milwaukee office. For tax purposes, the
taxpayer assigned sales to the producing factories in the states in which
they were located. Upon audit, the Wisconsin Department of Taxation
treated the sales as having been 100% made through or by offices in
42 CCH Wis. STATE TAX REP. 9200-084 (Nov. 27, 1962).
4 CCH WIs STATE TAX REP. 5200-015 (Mar. 16, 1961).
44CCH Wis. STATE TAX REP. 5200-035 (Nov. 22, 1961).
4 CCH Wis. STATE TAX REP. 5200-110 (Jun. 4, 1963).
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the State of Wisconsin. This was sustained by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin which found that "participation in the Wisconsin office in
the total sales picture was crucial"46 and that "what was done in Wis-
consin was major and significant"4 7 in comparison to what was done
elsewhere.
Under the Wisconsin statute,48 sales "made through or by offices"
located in the state are assignable to Wisconsin. The question, there
fore, was one of determining when and where a sale was "made." The
taxpayer in Globe49 conceded that the Wisconsin rule is that a sale is
"made" at the place where orders are approved or accepted. The tax-
payer argued, however, that the mere negotiation of an agreement to
supply the purchasers' requirements for goods constituted "an agree-
ment to sell" and did not constitute the "making" of the sale. It was
argued that it is recognized in commercial circles that sales are usually
made at the place of shipment which in this case coincided with the
place of manufacture and with the place where purchase orders were
received and billed. On these facts acceptance could occur only when
orders were sent to the seller and it accepted them and produced the
products for the buyer. All of these acts occurred at the various pro-
ducing plants throughout the United States and could not be considered
to have occurred in Wisconsin for tax purposes.
The Department argued that all of the sales were approved in Mil-
waukee and that personnel outside of the State of Wisconsin had no
authority to bind the company contractually. The following quotation
from the Department's brief may be illuminating: "Having assigned
one-third of the business income to the selling end of a business such
as Globe-Union's, the legislature had the further problem of assigning
the selling income to one of several states in which the aggregate of the
selling activity takes place. It considered the approval of contracts or
agreements to sell to be the predominant element of the selling process,
and assigned sales accordingly. In doing so the legislature was well
aware that the ultimate approval of a sales agreement usually involves
a great deal more than the mere signing of a piece of paper. It involves
executive judgments concerning all aspects of a business, such as en-
gineering, cost accounting, market analysis, credit, the relationship of
customers to each other, and many other considerations.!"5
In concluding that the role of the Wisconsin office was a major
factor in all of the taxpayer's sales, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
stated: "The basic contracts were executed by the Wisconsin officers.
The entire price structure, insofar as it was influenced by Globe-
46 Id. at 10,367.
47Ibid.48 
WIS. STAT. §7107(2) (c) (1961).
9 Note 45 supra.
50 Brief for Appellant, pp. 42-43, Globe-Union, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of
Taxation, supra note 45.
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Union's negotiations, was the product of activities in the Wisconsin
office. Cost determinations as well as engineering specifications were
calculated in Wisconsin. Payments were made to Wisconsin, and the
books were kept at the home office in this state." 51 The court also
stressed that all other negotiations or renegotiations would have been
handled in Wisconsin.
At this point, one wonders how far a home office located in Wis-
consin may control and determine sales policy, sales terms, and sales
conditions before it reaches the point where participation of that office
in the total sales picture becomes "crucial" and "major and significant"
in comparison with what was done elsewhere. Note that no prices were
set and neither quantities nor delivery dates were specified in the Globe-
Union contracts. It is to be hoped that the case has not opened a veritable
Pandora's box of problems for Wisconsin taxpayers. Up until now,
the overwhelming majority of Wisconsin tax cases involving multi-
state operations have been resolved without the parties having to resort
to litigation. This has been due in part to the wisdom of the legislature
in providing a specific statutory apportionment formula which can be
applied in most cases where mercantile or manufacturing operations
are involved. A taxpayer facing what may be a new era of uncertainty
can derive little comfort from the hope that the Department will ex-
ercise administrative self-restraint in future applications of the statute
and the decided cases to his particular situation.
The argument is sometimes made, in support of the position of the
Department, that in none of the decided cases did the facts show that
a taxpayer actually was taxed on more than 100% of its income. This
results from differences in the laws of the various states and from the
fact that a number of states have yet to adopt income tax statutes. This
argument would seem to beg the basic question which is whether or
not a given transaction is subjected to a restrictive multiple tax burden.
Even prohibited levies such as import duties can apply only to those
items which actually cross a tariff border and not to all transactions.
It also overlooks the evidentiary problem previously discussed which
is involved in any attempt to determine the ultimate effect of taxes im-
posed by the various states upon interstate commerce.
The question of whether a taxpayer was doing business within and
without the state within the meaning of the Wisconsin statutes and
therefore is entitled to apportionment is involved in a recent case which
has not, at the time of this writing, reached the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin. In Applied Power Industries, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department
of Taxation" the Circuit Court of Dane County reversed the Wis-
consin Board of Tax Appeals in finding that the taxpayer was entitled
51 Note 45 supra at 10,367.
52 CCH Wis. STATE TAX REP. 5200-117 (Aug. 22, 1963).
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to apportionment. The taxpayer involved was a Wisconsin manufactur-
ing corporation which had contracted with warehousers in California
and New York to maintain segregated inventories and to ship goods
on order to customers on approved lists. Orders from other customers
were to be approved in Wisconsin before shipment. The agreement
stated that the warehousers were independent contractors, not agents.
Invoices were finalized and billings were prepared at the Wisconsin
office. District representatives operated out of their own homes and
did not solicit orders. The circuit court found that the other states
involved had sufficient nexus to impose their taxes and that the ac-
tivities of the taxpayer constituted the conduct of intrastate commerce
within these other states.
The circuit court attempted to distinguish the Globe-Union case 3
stating: "Although these orders involved distributors on the accredited
list of the petitioner, the specific orders involved were not submitted
under any master contract nor did they involve any acceptance at the
home office of the company in Wisconsin." 54 On the basis of the facts
the court also attempted to distinguish the Blatz case95 which held in
part that maintaining personal property outside of the state does not of
itself constitute being engaged in business without Wisconsin, where
Wisconsin is the domiciliary state.
It is not the purpose of this article to hazard guesses as to the final
result in cases which have not yet been heard by the highest state
tribunal. It may be pertinent, however, to note that the litigation in
Applied Power Industries56 was begun before the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin rendered its opinion in Globe-Union.5 7 Whatever the result,
for Wisconsin income tax apportionment purposes the rule of ac-
ceptance governs in determining where a sale is made.
It is not entirely certain which particular acts will be deemed to
constitute acceptance under this rule. If we assume, for purposes of
discussion, that the legislature did, in fact, intend to emphasize home
office activities such emphasis would appear to be of questionable wis-
dom for a state seeking further industrial development. Since out-of-
state companies would not be taxed, the effect can only be to dis-
criminate against Wisconsin-based industries. If this view is correct,
legislative reconsideration would seem to be warranted.
Conclusion
The U.S. Constitution was intended to protect commerce among the
states from the imposition of burdens which would hinder free trade.
53 Note 45 supra.
54 Note 52 supra, at 10,391.
55 Wisconsin Department of Taxation v. Blatz Brewing Company, CCH Wis.
STATE TAX REP. 5200-010 (Mar. 7, 1961).
5 Note 52 supra.
57 Note 45 supra.
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In this context, the end to be achieved is the optimum allocation and
use of the economic resources of the nation. In contemporary terms, the
intent was to create an American common market. It succeeded fairly
well in the less complex economy of one hundred years ago.
Today, however, commerce has taken forms undreamed of in 1789.
The necessity for and the demand for services has forced the states
to seek additional revenues from both old and new sources. They have
been led to impose taxes which appear, at least in cumulative effect, to
burden and restrict the free trade the Constitution was intended to
protect.
Due to the complexity of the economic factors involved, and the
attendant difficulty in assembling and evaluating economic evidence, the
Supreme Court has tended to sustain these taxes where some reason-
able method of apportionment is provided and where it is satisfied
that the taxing state has jurisdiction over the taxpayer.
Properly exercising its prerogative to refuse to choose between the
various formulas presented to it for evaluation, the Court has, in effect,
asked Congress to act. The response has been limited and cautious.
The reason for this is that Congress is a political body and the electorate
has, for various reasons, failed to press in sufficient numbers for action.
It may also be appropriate for the Wisconsin legislature to consider
revision, or at least clarification, of its statutory apportionment formula.
In the absence of this, publication of administrative rulings issued by
the Department of Taxation or the promulgation of regulations would
be helpful. While it must be recognized that neither legislation nor rule-
making can eliminate all problems of construction, interpretation, and
application, uncertainty and in the end, litigation, are reduced where
principles are stated and are communicated to the taxpaying public.
[Vol. 47
